CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIFTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 5 August 1969, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:	Mr. S.A. FRAZAO
	Mr. P. CABRAL de MELLO
	Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA
Bulgaria:	Mr. K. CHRISTOV
	Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
	Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV
Burma:	U KYAW MIN
Canada:	Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
	Mr. R.W. CLARK
	Mr. J.R. MORDEN
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. T. LAHODA
	Mr. M. VEJVODA
	Mr. J. CINGROS
Ethiopia:	Mr. A. ZELLEKE
India:	Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
	Mr. K.P. JAIN
Italy:	Mr. R. CARACCIOLO
	Mr. F.L. OTTIERI
	Mr. R. BORSARELLI
	Mr. U. PESTALOZZA
Japan:	Mr. K. ASAKAI
	Mr. Y. NAKAYAMA
	Mr. M. OGISO
	Mr. T. SENGOKU
Mexico:	Mr. J. CASTANEDA
	Miss E. AGUIRRE
	Mr. R. VALERO

Mongolia:	Mr. M. DUGERSUREN
	Mr. S. ADIKHOU
Nigeria:	Alhaji SULE KOLO
	Mr. C.O. HOLLIST
	Mr. L.A. MALIKI
Poland:	Mr. A. CZARKOWSKI
	Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI
	Mr. H. STEPOSZ
	Mr. R. WLAZLO
Romania:	Mr. O. IONESCO
	Mr. A. SASU
	Mr. C. MITRAN
	Mrs. F. DINU
Sweden:	Mrs. A. MYRDAL
	Mr. A. EDELSTAM
	Mr. I. VIRGIN
	Mr. U. ERICSSON
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
	Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV
	Mr. V.V. SHOUSTOV
	Mr. V.B. TOULINOV
United Arab Republic:	Mr. H. KHALLAF
	Mr. O. SIRRY
	Mr. E.S. El REEDY
	Mr. M. ISMAIL
United Kingdom:	Mr. I.F. PORTER
	Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY
	Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE

United States of America:	Mr. J.F. LEONARD
	Mr. A.F. NEIDLE
	Mr. W. GIVAN
	Mr. R. McCORMACK
Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. D. PROTITCH
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I declare open the 425th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

2. Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): Today I want to proceed directly, as I usually do, to a substantive deliberation on one specific subject, namely to state -- although to a large extent it rather means restating -- the views of the Swedish delegation on biological and chemical means of warfare. The matter is urgent and, as I hope to be able to show, quite promising for at least one important step forward during this session on the road towards curbing the arms race in regard to those terror weapons.

3. Some important developments have taken place since I last dealt with this matter in March (ENDC/PV.397, para. 99), at least towards a fuller realization of the threat which B and C warfare poses to mankind. The group of experts assembled by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to carry out the task entrusted to him by General Assembly resolution 2454 A (XXIII) of 20 December 1968 (ENDC/237) has fulfilled its task with remarkable diligence within the required period of time; and the Secretary-General submitted on 1 July the requested report on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use (A/7575). There is also a growing awareness in the world at large of the horrors of those weapons. A debate has been flaring up, at the level of both specialists and laymen, about the wisdom of producing them. This public debate creates an increasing pressure on governments to ensure, within a short span of time, an effective, universally-accepted ban on their use and proofs of progress towards their ultimate elimination.

4. Against those developments -- the increase in knowledge and the impatience of the public debate -- should be measured the steps that we in the Eighteen-Nation Committee are ready to take. We have first to register with gratification that on 10 July the delegation of the United Kingdom introduced in the Committee a draft convention and an accompanying draft Security Council resolution on biological warfare (ENDC/255), thus following up the initiative it had taken last year in submitting the working paper contained in document ENDC/231*. The statements in this Committee following that recent British initiative have predominantly come to focus on whether or not it is advisable to treat separately biological and chemical means of warfare. My delegation will have some comments to make on that issue in a later context; but we definitely do not want

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it to be treated as a decisive issue. There is another line of distinction which I find it much more necessary to draw in our deliberations about international action, namely that between the question of use of those weapons in war and questions pertaining to preparations for such use of them, i.e. their development, testing, production and stockpiling.

5. In regard to use -- or rather non-use -- the world community has already established regulations inscribed formally in international legislation and/or respected as rules of customary international law, with an origin in The Hague Conventions from the beginning of this century and most specifically spelt out in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (A/7575, p. 117), reinforced by General Assembly resolutions of both 1966 and 1968 (resolution 2162 B (XXI) (ENDC/185) and resolution 2454 A (XXIII). The first duty of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should therefore be to safeguard that existing bulwark for the non-use of both B and C weapons.

6. In regard to questions of non-production, if I may thus denote in a brief term the second set of problems, we in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament will face quite a different and in a way a more creative task, entailing a need for some innovation. For our proceeding on that latter -- as I have called it, creative -- course, the initiative of Mr. Mulley should give valuable guidance. I will return to that issue in greater detail towards the end of my statement. But from the very outset I have wanted to make clear that the Swedish delegation foresees and favours a double task for the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament: one imminent and, I hope, uncontroversial, the other requiring more of painstaking study and bridging of differences.

7. In my intervention today, consequently, I intend to deal in turn with three subjects: first, the experts' report; second, the question of securing universal adherence to the ban on use in warfare of B and C weapons, embodied in the Geneva Protocol; and finally, the United Kingdom draft convention, intended to secure the elimination of, in the first instance, the biological means of warfare.

8. The Secretary-General's report provides an excellent point of departure for our dealing much more in depth with all questions pertaining to B and C weapons than has hitherto been possible. In accordance with the task given to him and with the assistance of distinguished experts in the field, the Secretary-General has supplied us with a technical and scientific background against which to test our proposals. He has also presented three very important recommendations for such action, to which I will return.

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9. One of the highlights of the report is the elucidation of the fact that chemical and biological agents usable for the purpose of war show a very wide variation in their effects. They can therefore be ranged in a scale covering all possible intended uses: from agents intended to be generally lethal to those intended only to incapacitate an enemy temporarily. This variability in regard to effect is applicable to both chemical and biological agents: they may be lethal or temporarily incapacitating. The report also brings out that any intended use relies upon calculations as to the probabilities that the desired result would be reached. A margin of uncertainty is inherent, however, and it implies that the use of a lethal agent may still leave attacked persons surviving, or -- which is a more cruel consequence -- that the use of an incapacitating agent may still cause some severe casualties or even deaths. Taking all these factors into consideration, we think the unavoidable conclusion to be drawn is that the experts also explicitly state: that no definite limits or borders can be drawn in regard to different types of chemical agents or biological agents as being lethal or non-lethal.

10. This is supported by another important fact which emerges from the report. Were chemical or biological agents ever to be used as weapons -- in a regular war, I have to add -- they would be used not alone but together with conventional weapons. One must conclude that if used for military purposes the effects even of very safe incapacitating agents would enhance the kill effect of the conventional weapons. This is also the opinion of the experts. A further risk in B and C warfare which also tends to make any distinct borderline between lethal and non-lethal meaningless for a prohibition of their use in war is the invitation to retaliation, which in turn practically inevitably implies a risk of escalation, so that more deleterious agents would be used.

11. This theme of retaliation is worthy of some elaboration. Man's mind has long been preoccupied with the possibilities of "humane war": that is, of finding some means which did not kill or severely hurt but only incapacitated people. If such agents were the sole ones to be used in war -- and were used solely against military personnel, I should add -- the cruelty of war would be diminished, perhaps to the point of permitting total elimination of conventional weapons. Science and technology eventually did develop means of graduated severity, which have been greeted as considerable advances. A time seemed to come when external enemies could be dealt with in the same

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way as rioting citizens in one's own country: they would not need to be killed in order to be controlled. This concept, appealing to our feelings, does not, however, withstand the realities of war situations, where the chain of action-reaction-response does not stop in the same way as in a domestic situation.

12. On the other issue to which much attention has been given in this Committee -- whether strict borderlines can be drawn between chemical and biological means of warfare -- the report seems to us to be quite illuminating and not at all ambiguous. To begin with, it is very helpful that succinct definitions of chemical and biological agents are given in the report. As we have not yet in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament discussed the implications of these logical definitions, it might be pertinent to take up that subject somewhat more in detail.

13. In the report it is said of chemical agents that they have a direct toxic action in an organism, that is, man, animal or plant (A/7575/para. 17). Inherent in this information is that a chemical agent interferes directly with the chemical processes taking place in the living organism, either upsetting their balance or causing them to cease altogether. Whichever happens depends mainly upon how much of the critical amount of the agent in question has reached an organism. In other words, as long as a chemical agent capable of interfering with the chemical processes in a living organism is used in war with that intention, it is a chemical warfare agent. This explains why the experts consider isolated bacterial toxins, for example, or herbicides, to be chemical warfare agents, contrary to what has been the case in some other studies.

14. Concerning the biological agents, the experts give a more lengthy definition:

> "... living organisms, whatever their nature, or infective material derived from them, which are intended to cause disease ... in man, animals or plants, and which depend for their effects on their ability to multiply in the person, animal or plant attacked." (ibid.)

The main point in this carefully-worded definition is that a biological agent is capable of multiplying itself in an attacked organism, utilizing the products of that organism, and thereby causing the illness and perhaps the subsequent death of the organism.

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15. Now, that agent may be a bacterium, as was envisaged already by the authors of the Geneva Protocol. In an exactly analogous way viruses and rickettsiae, the existence of which was not realized in 1925, may reproduce themselves in an organism. As to infective material, science today also knows that during special conditions -- but in the future perhaps not so special -- isolated genetic substances, for instance from bacteria, can infect another organism and multiply in it. As long as such reproduction in the infected organism leads to its death or to other insufficiency, the causing agent when used in war is a biological warfare agent. It is important to note that there seems to have been no difficulty in ascribing to the limited word "bacteriological" in the Geneva Protocol a more general meaning covering the subsequent development in the biological field.

16. The definitions as such obviously make it possible to treat biological and chemical agents separately. It is interesting, however, that not even the experts feel sure that the borderline between the two types of agents established now can be upheld for all future time. If this is the technical and scientific situation, I suppose it would be wise to take this into account during our discussions and not to be too definite about the two categories, recalling the previous difficulties to which too narrow technical descriptions have given rise, not least in relation to the interpretation of the Geneva Protocol, even if its general idea has been quite clear to everybody. In parenthesis, I wish to warn my colleagues against adopting in this context the term "biochemical" to cover both types of agents. This term already has a specific meaning in scientific language, our experts tell us.

17. The evaluations in the report of the potentially devastating effects on man and society of the B and C agents are also of the utmost importance for us. Thus, although evidence given in the report shows to what a terrifyingly high degree scientific and technological military knowledge tells how to perform coldly-calculated precision attacks on pre-set areas with B and C weapons, it is still more striking how potentially indiscriminate chemical and especially biological weapons are with regard to effects on the civilian population when it is attacked in cities or by immense drifting clouds of agents perhaps covering whole countries. The situation for the civilian population is aggravated by the fact that many countries would not have or could not divert sufficient economic resources to provide means for their protection in the form of shelters, gas masks, etc., or even for protective research. The report also indicates

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what damage can be done to crops through both chemical and biological means. Such "anti-food warfare" hits the civilian population, of course, and may even be directed against it.

18. Another indiscriminate effect might arise from even a limited use of biological agents -- that is, the establishment in an attacked area of quite new biological agents or the re-introduction of agents eradicated earlier, through attacks not necessarily against man but against animals and insects in the area of attack. Certainly, even without the scare of the large plagues inherited from the dark centuries, one must today draw a firm conclusion that by large-scale initiation of B and C warfare man might come near to upsetting the delicate balance upon which his existence rests.

19. There may be an opportunity to come back to several of the vital pieces of information contained in the report, but at present only one more aspect of importance for choosing our route of action will be mentioned. Neither chemical nor biological agents are weapons in themselves. In order to be usable on a militarily-significant scale they must be built into rather advanced weapons systems, allowing their dissemination or delivery in a controlled way. This leads to a dualistic condition: although it would be possible, perhaps comparatively easy, to launch an isolated attack with any kind of these agents, albeit with unforeseeable consequences, it would take very considerable efforts to build up a war capability with these weapons, implying also the capability to protect oneself in a prolonged chemical or biological war. Accordingly the experts make the observation that, if an international agreement could give relief from having to make these efforts, that would not detract from any nation's security (ibid., para. 374).

20. One more thought may be added as to the risks described by the experts; it concerns the risk of proliferation. Many of the chemical and biological agents are widely known and are dealt with in open publications. Information about new and effective vectors for spreading them can also be obtained. It may become advisable to look into the arms trade from this proliferation angle, with regard both to the chemical and biological agents themselves and to the means of their delivery.

21. As I have just tried to illustrate, the report of the Secretary-General has laid the groundwork on which the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament can proceed to propose action. As I said in my introductory sentences, the Swedish delegation wants

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to divide that task quite sharply between, on the one hand, measures prohibiting the use of both biological and chemical weapons and, on the other hand, measures to prohibit preparations for such use -- that is, their development, production, testing and stockpiling. This logical separation of two policy issues, but not of two categories of weapons, is also sustained by the conclusions of the experts.

22. Here I wish to quote three sentences in sequence from the report. First:

> "Were these weapons ever to be used" -- the italics are mine -- "on a large scale in war, no one could predict how enduring the effects would be, and how they would affect the structure of society and the environment in which we live." (ibid., para. 375)

Second:

> "Their use" -- my italics -- "... has already been condemned and prohibited by international agreements, in particular the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and, more recently, in resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations." (ibid., para. 376)

And third:

> "The prospects for general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and hence for peace throughout the world, would brighten significantly if the development, production and stockpiling" -- and here I want italics again -- "of chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents intended for purposes of war were to end and if they were eliminated from all military arsenals." (ibid.)

This spells out the full course of our action.

23. What are, then, the avenues for action on which we can immediately embark? The Swedish delegation holds that the best is to follow the suggestions made by the Secretary-General in his foreword to the Experts' Report:

> "1. To renew the appeal to all States to accede to the Geneva Protocol of 1925;
>
> "2. To make a clear affirmation that the prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol applies to the use in war of all chemical, bacteriological and biological agents (including tear gas and other harassing agents), which now exist or which may be developed in the future;

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"3. To call upon all countries to reach agreement to halt the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents for purposes of war and to achieve their effective elimination from the arsenal of weapons." (ibid., p.xii)

24. The first two recommendations deal with the prohibition of use and the third with prohibition of production and so on. When we come to consider the latter we will, of course, centre our attention on the British proposal for a convention on biological warfare.

25. But I wish first to deal with the question of non-use. The Secretary-General's first recommendation is in full harmony with General Assembly resolution 2162 B (XXI), which was adopted in 1966 without any dissenting votes, urging strict adherence by all States -- regardless of accession -- to the principles and objectives of the Protocol and condemning all actions contrary to those objectives. That needs only to be reiterated. In that connexion I want to support a suggestion made by the representative of the Mongolian People's Republic the other day (ENDC/PV.424, para. 105) that it would be fitting that States be encouraged to sign and ratify the Geneva Protocol before the forty-fifth anniversary of the Protocol. That would make 17 June 1970 the target date for greatly increasing the number of adherents.

26. The Secretary-General's second recommendation seems to us to give succinct expression to views expressed by a number of delegations both in the United Nations and in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

27. My delegation had the honour of suggesting last year that

"... some joint collective statement in the General Assembly or elsewhere might be useful which, without regard to the various positions and practices of the past as to the extent of the existing ban, would enable States to register adherence to a ban on all B and C means of warfare, comprehensively interpreted". (ENDC/PV.391, para.20)

We have been gratified to note that this suggestion has met with interest among several delegations. The presentation of the experts' report and the appeal by the Secretary-General for a clear affirmation that the prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol applies to the use in war of all chemical, bacteriological and biological agents which now exist, or which may be developed in the future, encourages us to try to develop somewhat the suggestion we offered last year.

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28. Our grounds for making the suggestion were several. One was the awareness that, although new agreements would be needed to assure a ban through disarmament measures on producing B and C means of warfare, the adoption of any new agreement repeating the prohibition against use contained in the Geneva Protocol might risk, or might be taken by some to risk, undermining the ban contained in that Protocol. In any case it would be superfluous. It would duplicate what has now come to be considered and respected as customary international law. The whole complex of laws about wars, of the Geneva Protocol and the tradition in which it is perpetuated, have come to equal what I would like to call a commandment: "Thou shalt not resort to chemical and biological weapons." A declaration ought to affirm the commanding character of that ban.

29. Another ground for our making the suggestion was the feeling that, although there had been some variations in the past as to the interpretation of the existing ban, these were not so wide in extent nor shared by any great number of countries. They could therefore be remedied easily by some joint statement focusing on the future. We started out from the widely-accepted view that -- and I quote myself:

> "... it would be both desirable and natural explicitly to give the Protocol a broad interpretation ... and to consider all existing B and C weapons as belonging in one set and the prohibition to use any of them as valid without exceptions." (ibid., par. 19)

30. Yet another ground for our suggestion was the fear that, but for some collective statement authoritatively declaring the existing ban on B and C means of warfare to be comprehensive, there would remain a risk of escalation. A State which applied a restrictive interpretation to the ban might use some B or C agents, which it considered legal, against a State which, on the contrary, would consider that a violation had occurred and hence that it was justified in retaliating. It might then use a somewhat more dangerous agent which the first State, in its turn, would consider illegal and therefore as justifying counter-retaliation. The importance of this point becomes clear if we consider that the only sanction against breaches of the Geneva Protocol so far provided is, in reality, retaliation.

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31. It does seem to us that the States which concluded the Geneva Protocol meant it to be comprehensive. No party has made any reservation about its scope. And when the matter was officially discussed at governmental level -- that is in connexion with the preparations for the League of Nations Disarmament Conference -- the French Government, which is the depositary Government of the Geneva Protocol and was the first to ratify it, stated specifically in a note that it considered the use of lachrymatory gases to be covered by the prohibition of the Geneva Protocol. The British delegation in a memorandum agreed, as did the other representatives of Governments parties to the Protocol who spoke on the matter.

32. Viewing this question of the scope of the prohibitions as it looks today, we have to register the regrettable fact that different opinions have been expressed on whether tear gas and other harassing agents as well as herbicides are covered by the prohibition. The majority of States parties to the Protocol which regard the comprehensive rules as binding would, of course, not want to reduce its value by accepting exemptions.

33. In the experts' report it is stated that tear gases have --

> "... been widely used in warfare as harassing agents, in order to enhance the effectiveness of conventional weapons, or to facilitate the capture of enemy personnel." (A/7575, para.20)

This makes them into means of warfare with deleterious effects. I want to stress, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, that the military purpose makes this use very different from their use in domestic situations. The same reasoning should be employed concerning the use of herbicides as anti-food weapons: when they are used militarily with the intention to damage life conditions for man, this is fundamentally different from their employment domestically to improve man's food or other resources.

34. For those several reasons some action in order to clarify and consolidate the existing prohibitory rules would appear to be both timely and necessary. This is the kind of task with which the General Assembly is familiar -- indeed, a task expressly laid upon it by the Charter (Article 13, 1, a). Although most of the codification instruments have so far taken the form of conventions, on occasion declarations by the General Assembly have also been used. It is a declaration of

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that kind which my delegation believes the Eighteen-Nation Committee might seek to agree upon and submit to the Assembly for adoption. It may be recalled that the Committee did not hesitate at one time to grapple with a similar task: namely a declaration banning war propaganda (ENDC/65).

35. What should be included in a declaration consolidating the existing ban on the use of B and C means of warfare? The answer is simple: the aim should be to condemn in the most clear-cut way the use for hostile purposes of those means as contrary to the laws of war. Such a condemnation would have to encompass all agents defined and described by the experts in their report. Those descriptions and definitions, covering B and C means of warfare comprehensively, ought to be seen as a modern, scientific formulation of the contents of the ban under already existing laws of war.

36. It would indeed be a proud achievement if, by an unambiguous declaration, the road of the world community were cleared for the future: no more use of any B and C means of warfare in international conflicts. My delegation is ready to co-operate with other delegations in order to submit to the Committee, at an appropriate moment, a working paper containing suggestions on the language of such a declaration.

37. I wish now to wind up by turning to the British initiative, and to offer some comments and suggestions on the draft convention contained in document ENDC/255.

38. The approach I have outlined earlier today as far as non-use is concerned should have made it clear that we do not think it necessary or even desirable that a convention on non-production should contain also prohibitions against use; while it would, of course, be worth while to retain a reference to the already-existing prohibition concerning use. That is the reason behind the rather radical suggestion we made in the informal meeting the other day that the present article I in the British draft might be deleted and replaced by the present article VI, containing reference to the Geneva Protocol, although it might have to be slightly reworded to serve the purpose of being a clear affirmation.

39. The next question, already amply commented upon in this Committee, refers to the advisability of separating the treatment of B and C weapons. The Swedish delegation would not take a strong view on this issue. While we adamantly hold

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that there should be no separation of them in regard to their use in war -- the whole range of existing and possible B and C agents being treated as an entity -- we can see certain reasons for starting out on the road towards their elimination by attacking one set only, and then the first one must be the biological means of warfare.

40. An important reason for that is that there exists no claim for any need to produce B weapons for domestic use. If the B weapons are to be treated separately -- as in the British draft -- the convention would, however, have to contain strong pledges to continue negotiations to arrive at similar restrictions on the production, etcetera, of chemical weapons. The present article V seems too vague, speaking as it does only of "effective measures to strengthen the existing constraints on the use" — and I would italicize the word "use" -- "of chemical methods of warfare" (ENDC/255). In the field of biological weapons we are after all, with the proposed convention, striving for more than prohibiting their use in war, which, as I have said, is already taken care of by existing rules. The wider purpose of prohibiting production, etcetera, must be spelt out also in any declaration of intent regarding chemical weapons.

41. In that context one might also contemplate an insertion in the preamble of a similar declaration of intent as far as chemical weapons are concerned. That would constitute a parallel to the non-proliferation Treaty, in which a declaration of intent concerning further negotiations relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race is to be found both in the preamble (ENDC/226*) and in an article in the text itself (article VI).

42. Article II in the British draft is in the main acceptable to my delegation. It could, however, be made clearer in the text that the parties would have the right to pursue military research efforts which were directed towards defence measures against biological weapons.

43. Referring to article III, we recognize the difficulties connected with a regular control machinery and understand the reasons why the British delegation has refrained from trying to introduce such a procedure.

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44. I wish, however, to remind the Committee of some ideas in this connexion which the Swedish delegation has put forward on earlier occasions. I might, for instance refer to my statement in this Committee on 20 August 1968 (ENDC/PV.391, paras. 31-35). Our basic idea was, and still is, that a universal openness about activities in this field would gradually create confidence. To that effect, a non-armament measure such as the one now contemplated could contain provisions for the encouragement of greater openness. The main components of such a provision would be generally-worded obligations for the parties to take part in an informal exchange of information on scientific and technical development. That might be coupled with a more specific undertaking to register with the Secretary-General of the United Nations relevant scientific and technical material, which could then be organized and published by competent staff. There could also be a provision for international meetings under the aegis of the United Nations to evaluate scientific and technical developments within biology and chemistry from the point of view of possible risks of breaches of the undertakings in the convention. My delegation would welcome comments by our colleagues on those ideas.

45. Several delegations have stressed -- in formal or informal meetings -- the need to devote more attention to the matter of control than has been devoted to it hitherto. As this matter was not touched upon in the experts' report, it may be a subject calling for some more technical exploration. Is, for instance, testing of B and C weapons more accessible for verification than their production? What about the possibilities of control on delivery systems and their manufacture?

46. I do not wish at this juncture to go deeper into the problems raised in connexion with the present United Kingdom draft convention. I hope all representatives will study it carefully and give their detailed comments on its text.

47. I will end by summing up our ideas in the following manner:

48. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should go forward to the United Nations with a two-pronged approach:

(1) A declaration, in the form of a draft contained in the report of this Committee, confirming the ban on use in war of all B and C weapons, binding on all nations;

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(2) A proposal to continue to study in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament the total elimination of these weapons, starting to work on the basis of the United Kingdom draft convention on biological warfare.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 425th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador A.A. Roshchin, representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

"A statement was made by the representative of Sweden.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 7 August 1969 at 10.30 a.m.".

The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.